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Abstract 
Legal norms and social behaviours are some of the human aspects surrounding the 
effectiveness and future of DRM security. Further exploration of these aspects would 
help unravel the complexities of the interaction between rights protection security and 
law. Most importantly, understanding the perspectives behind the circumvention of 
content security may have a significant impact on DRM effectiveness and acceptance 
at the same time.  While there has been valuable research on consumer acceptability, 
(The INDICARE project, Bohle 2008, Akester 2009) there is hardly any work on the 
human perspective of content creators. Taking video games as a case study, this 
paper employs qualitative socio-legal analysis and an interdisciplinary approach to 
explore this particular aspect of content protection. 
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1. Introduction1 
Copyright infringements and the evolution of digital rights management (DRM) have 
been among some of the most antagonistic points of the digital era. The debate 
surrounding the effectiveness and future of rights protection mechanisms has been 
closely aligned to the subjects of interoperability, user privacy, user acceptance, and 
maintenance of secure systems. While research from the content industry focused on 
the effectiveness of digital locks, most research from the users’ side examined legal 
and social impact of content protection. The human aspects of DRM technologies, 
however, have been one of the lesser explored areas.2 Moreover, when human aspects 
were considered by the relevant literature, they mostly investigated the user 
perspective. Legal compliance and acceptability of protecting technologies has rarely 
been analysed from the viewpoint of the other players at stake: the content creator and 
the content distributor.  
It is questionable whether a flawless rights protection system can ever be 
accomplished when it is based on a technology incapable of distinguishing between 
an attacker and an authorised user; and it is even more questionable whether copyright 
issues should be entirely entrusted to technology. On the other hand, it has been 
argued successfully that that self-enforcement of copyright lowers transaction costs 
and it is therefore considered economically optimal.3 However, it is submitted that 
this “computational copyright”4 can only be considered to be truly successful if it 
takes into account all perspectives involved. In other words, DRM should not ignore 
the human component in security strategies.  
This paper seeks to explore human aspects of DRM protection from the perspective of 
content developers. To this end it will review the available research and fill the gaps 
by providing original empirical data. We have chosen to focus on the game industry 
as a case study, because of its economic relevance compared to other creative 
industries. In 2014, for example, the UK computer video games market grew by 7.5% 
(to reach £2.5bn), while the market for videos decreased by 1.4% (to reach £2.2bn) 
and the market for music fell by 1.6% (to reach £1billion).5  
While this has obvious positive consequences for growth and innovation, such an 
expansion should be matched by an extended attention to the fundamental values, the 
                                                 
1 This paper is the main deliverable of a research project funded by the Fusion Investment Fund of 
Bournemouth University. The fund was awarded to Dr. Marcella Favale, Senior Research Fellow at 
Bournemouth University and member of the Centre for Intellectual Property Policy and Management 
(CIPPM) mfavale@bournemouth.ac.uk. 
2 R Anderson, Security Engineering 2nd ed. (Hoboken: Wiley, 2008) at 679-725, at 679. 
3 W Gordon, “Fair Use as Market Failure: a Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax case and 
its Predecessors” (1982) 82 Col L. R. 1600-1657, at 1654. 
4 O Conetta and B Schafer, “Self-enforcing or self-executing? What Computational Copyright can 
learn from LKIF Transaction Configurations for Eurobonds”, CREATe Working Paper 2014/12 
(October 2014), available at https://zenodo.org/record/12432/files/CREATe-Working-Paper-2014-
12.pdf (accessed 16 Oct 15). 
5 See generally L Butler, “ERA UK Market Statistics” (2014) available at http://www.gera-
europe.org/info-stats/overview.aspx (accessed 16/04/2015). 
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norms, and the social interactions impacted by these technologies. The perspectives in 
this work are limited to games, but the questions raised could be applied to any type 
of rights protected digital content. 
This paper aims to understand the extent to which the human aspects surrounding 
DRM technology and circumvention6 are perceived, identified and understood by 
videogame developers. To this end, the paper consists of two parts. In the first part a 
systematic analysis of the relevant literature will help identify the key human aspects 
revolving around content protection. The discussion surrounding fairness and DRM 
will be explored from the point of view of the content developers, content distributors, 
and content users. This part benefits from the contribution of academics from various 
disciplines (law, cyber security, game development) in order to give a multi-
dimensional picture of the issues surrounding DRM. A number of key questions shall 
be identified by the analysis of these opposing perspectives, which will be proposed, 
in the second part of the paper, to a sample of developers from the videogame 
industry.  
 
2. The evolution of digital locks7 
Before DRM is discussed is more in detail, it would be useful to briefly examine its 
evolution, particularly in terms of some approaches that have been followed 
throughout the history of computer/video games development. Very early attempts at 
games development did not concern themselves overtly with DRM, as the market was 
not mainstream or large enough to warrant this. With the advent of home computers, 
there emerged a need for developers to protect gaming software from piracy in order 
to safeguard revenues. With the earlier cartridge-based consoles - at least until the 
advent of the generation of consoles with a CD drive in the mid-1990s, for example 
Sony’s original PlayStation- software protection originally focused on ensuring that 
any game could only be used by the user who purchased it, via targeted checks. This 
usually manifested in the form of a manual/physical approach. The diversity and 
ingenuity of methods employed remain fascinating to games audiences and relevant 
historians alike to this day, sometimes for the sheer imagination behind them, and 
sometimes because of the incredible ease with which these could be bypassed today. 
This manual/physical approach, in pre-Internet days, was normally reliant on 
inputting data from physical documentation provided alongside the game when 
purchased (i.e. included in its box). This could either be in the user manual itself, or 
something more elaborate included within the box of the game. A genre of games 
which explored more imaginative approaches linking DRM with materials and 
                                                 
6 Data has been retrieved from Scopus, IEEE’sXplore, book chapters, journal articles and the 
conference proceedings of the ACM Digital Library. The literature selection utilised Google Scholar 
and Scopus to identify the most frequently cited material. The analysis is supported by NVivo 
qualitative analysis software using an open coding technique with a hierarchal structure with four 
master codes of Developer view, Distributor view, User view and Legal view. The sub-code structure 
was broken down into: a) Constraints of DRM, b) interoperability of DRM, c) opinions on DRM, and, 
finally, d) reasons for DRM. The socio–legal approach identifies and explores the elements of law and 
the human behavioural aspects in rights protection security by focussing on the perspectives and 
opinions of the stakeholder groups. 
7 This section is authored by Dr Christos Gatzidis, Principal Academic in Creative Technology at 
Bournemouth University, cgatzidis@bournemouth.ac.uk. 
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documents (plus on occasion the game itself) was adventure games; a very popular, 
story-driven and puzzle-based genre which was part of the gaming mainstream from 
the mid-1980s and during a large part of the 1990s. It is also notable that this form of 
DRM protection would not always come at the beginning of the game, but only once 
the player had made some progress (and could not progress further without passing 
the aforementioned targeted check with the correct user input, or worse yet, would be 
killed off as punishment for incorrect entries).  
Two developers of the era, who both had a number of impactful and successful games 
in this genre and employed DRM (in different ways yet based on the above principle), 
were Sierra On-Line and LucasArts, both now defunct. Sierra On-Line used DRM in 
many of their titles, amongst which was King’s Quest III (1986), where the manual 
contained the different steps for the user to follow, and also components needed for 
different magic spells, all at the core of the gameplay. Leisure Suit Larry 5 (1991) 
featured another typical approach of the era towards DRM; codes provided in the 
documentation. These codes were to be used when the player needed to fly to 
different locations in order for the game to progress) presented. However, the codes 
were printed in black font against a red back background in order to make it difficult 
to photocopy and pass on to another player who had not purchased the game (and was 
in possession of the documentation). LucasArts took this method a step further, with 
more complex approaches such as the one exhibited on the Secret of the Monkey 
Island game (1990). The box of the game included a physical, rotatable contraption 
that resembled a wheel (with two different parts), which the player would use for the 
check (faces, years and locations were used on this particular game’s DRM). This 
approach was used again in the game’s 1991 sequel, although this time the theme was 
not pirate faces as before (revolving around the theme of the series), but recipe parts 
and dosages. It is difficult to estimate how effective these approaches were and how 
much, if indeed at all, they deterred piracy. However, the intricacy/complexity of 
some of these approaches reveals how seriously protecting DRM was taken, already, 
during the 1980s and 1990s in gaming software.  
Today there is no need for the above DRM approaches for games. These can alienate 
customers, not only because they are cumbersome and obstructive, but also expensive 
and obsolete (as games have moved from the physical retail approach to digital 
downloads and boxes full of material are of the past) and would, in any case, be very 
easy to bypass. A very commonplace, modern approach to DRM, is ensuring that the 
user and game remain online at all times for a continuous check of any possible 
breach. This approach has evolved, and while it is more streamlined in 2015 from a 
technical point of view, there remain problems with it (albeit of a different nature to 
the ones observed with the earlier games discussed). An interesting case study for this 
is Blizzard’s Diablo 3(2012) for the PC platform (and later on for consoles as well). 
Whilst this DRM approach is effective, this specific game garnered a significant 
amount of attention, as early issues with servers on the developer side effectively 
made it impossible for many users to play the game. This attracted a significant 
amount of controversy because of the immense popularity of the game and, 
inevitably, a lot of negative publicity, not just for the game itself (which still 
performed well commercially and critically) but also, and predominantly, for this 
specific approach to enforcing DRM. Regardless of the problems such approaches to 
DRM can cause, it is envisaged that some games developers will continue to use them 
as they can offer advantages above DRM, such as collecting player data that can then 
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be analysed (for the developers’ and even players’ benefit), as we will see further 
below in this paper. 
 
3.  The “Unfairness” of DRM 
Piracy is the use of a copyrighted material without paying for it.8 Digital piracy occurs 
regardless of what type of media is being developed or for what distribution platform 
it is intended for. The factors influencing the user’s desire to circumvent DRM in acts 
of piracy can be construed as a social problem driven by human aspects such as intent, 
motive, moral judgement, and social consensus. 
Possible reasons behind the circumvention of DRM go beyond any technological 
weaknesses of the security into the human aspects of security. The growth of online 
gaming, and the uptake of faster internet connections along with the rise of initiatives 
such as the ‘Occupy Movement’ against corporatism and economic inequality9 have 
provided opponents to DRM with more ways to justify the circumventing actions. 
Arguably, video games manufacturers view DRM as a necessary instrument in the 
fight against copyright violation. However, the critics of DRM allege that it stifles 
innovation and fair competition by quashing lawful uses of digital content. As such, it 
is creating economic and social inequality regardless of the context of the intended 
use.10 
Because of this perceived economic and social inequality between rights holders and 
users of games, it becomes imperative for the legal system to ensure that there is 
fairness for all in the event of a legal dispute. Fairness is achieved when people 
restrain their liberty in ways necessary to yield advantages for all.11 Fairness in the 
English legal system is underpinned by the principle of Equity. This is described as 
“the means by which a system of law balances the need for sufficient judicial 
discretion to achieve fairness in individual factual circumstances”.12 Because of the 
perceived bias towards the rights holders, it is essential that “justice should be seen to 
involve procedural fairness and a fair decisions being reached by an objective 
decision-maker, whilst protecting the rights of individuals and promoting public 
confidence in the legal process”.13  
Perhaps the most serious drawback to the debate surrounding the effectiveness and 
future of DRM is that fairness for all, as defined by Hart, may never be achievable 
                                                 
8 G Nagesh, “24% of Web Traffic Involves Piracy” Hillicon Valley Blog, the Hill (2011) available at 
http://thehill.com/policy/technology/141509-study-24-percent-of-web-traffic-involves-piracy (accessed 
10 Apr 15). 
9 M Townsend, “Parliament Square fence crushes protest rights, says Occupy Democracy” (2015) 
available at: http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/03/boris-johnson-occupy-democracy-
london-protest-fence (accessed 15 Apr 2015). 
10 B Litlow, “DRM's Rights Protection Capability: a review” (2012) Volume 1 The First International 
Conference on Computational Science and Information Management 12-17, at 12. 
11 H Hart, “Are there any natural rights?” (1955) 64(2) The Philosophical Review 175 -191, at 17. 
12 A Hudson, (2012) Equity and Trusts 7th ed. (Oxford: Routledge, 2012) at 5-6, at 5. 
13 Y-L Chang, “Who should own access rights? A game-theoretical approach to striking the optimal 
balance in the debate over Digital Rights Management” (2007) 15(4) Artificial Intelligence and Law 
323-356, at 323. 
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across groups serving such different interests. Consequently, the usage restrictions 
implemented by content distributors extends beyond intellectual property monopoly 
and it often raises issues of consumer acceptance.14 Because of these restrictions, 
DRM can seem inequitable and unfair when applying Hart’s principle of fairness. 
This apparent lack of fairness and bias in the direction of rights-holding organisations 
results in DRM getting a lot of attention by copyright academic, content industry and 
media.15 
 
4. Why designing DRM is hard16 
DRM is a suite of technologies that protect the rights of various stakeholders 
associated with digital content.  Typically, these stakeholders are content producers, 
consumers, and publishers.  Although there is no standard model for DRM 
architecture, DRM solutions typically include components for: 
* managing content to be protected; 
* creating and managing licenses that specify the rules for consumption of content; 
* tracking usage of content, to ensure this is in line with license rules; and 
* submitting packaged content for management by the DRM architecture. 
These components are also supported by a number of security services.  The 
expectations on these services are myriad and included guaranteeing the integrity of 
licenses, protecting content against tampering, authenticating consumers before 
protected content can be accessed, and safeguarding sensitive data at rest and in 
transit.17  These services are implemented to defend against attacks to DRM protocols, 
attacks against DRM client software, and the software and hardware used to store and 
render the protected content.18 
Designing any software system to meet the security expectations of different 
stakeholders is hard because product innovation is the main goal for building software 
rather than security.  As a result, the time-consuming user research activities 
necessary for modelling these expectations is de-emphasised, and difficult to sustain 
throughout long projects.19  DRM is unusual in that securing content is one of the key 
goals of any DRM system, but these challenges still remain because designers must be 
                                                 
14 C Darroch, “Problems and Progress in the Protection of Videogames: A Legal and Sociological 
Perspective” (2012) 1(1) The Manchester Review of Law, Crime and Ethics 136-172, at 136. 
15 E Diehl, Securing Digital Video: Techniques for DRM and Content Protection (New York: Springer, 
2012) 4-5, at 4. 
16 This section is authored by Dr Shamal Faily, Senior Lecturer in Systems Security Engineering within 
the Department of Computing and Informatics, Bournemouth University, sfaily@bournemouth.ac.uk. 
17 S Michiels et al. “Towards a software architecture for DRM” (2005) Proceedings of the 5th ACM 
Workshop on Digital Rights Management (DRM ’05) 65–74. 
18 G Taban, A Cárdenas, and V D Gligor, “Towards a secure and interoperable drm architecture” 
Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management (DRM ’06) at 69–78 (New York, 
NY, USA: ACM, 2006). 
19 S Faily et al, “Usability and Security by Design: A Case Study in Research and Development” in 
Proceedings of the NDSS Workshop on Usable Security, Internet Society, 8 Feb 2015 San Diego CA. 
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mindful of the impact of DRM on consumer rights.20  Unfortunately, designing for 
DRM also introduces several particular challenges. 
First, as difficult as designing security is, designing DRM is even harder because it 
entails integrating security mechanisms such cryptographic libraries, access control 
systems, and secure storage solutions into a coherent whole.  Moreover, as Michiels 
indicates,21 there are many candidate architectures for satisfying the requirements of 
different stakeholders.  Each configuration might be associated with different threat 
and trust models, and have a different ‘attack surface’. Moreover, despite the 
pervasiveness of DRM technology in practice, there are no case studies in the 
literature reporting on the design, evolution, and lessons learned implementing DRM 
software architectures ‘in the wild’.  Without such studies, there is little support for 
designers on encapsulating the expectations of different DRM stakeholders in DRM 
architectures. 
Second, the trust and threat models associated with DRM are byzantine.  From a 
traditional security perspective, one might assume that both the content owner and 
content user are trustworthy, and any malicious agents may be trying to spoof 
communication traffic, or intercept and tamper with it.  However, when we think 
about DRM, these models start to break down.  For example, content users may 
accept distributors knowing about purchase details, but may not be happy about 
distributing misusing this data by sharing it with 3rd parties.  Theoretical security 
models assume that legitimate use and misuse are well-defined, but this is not the case 
with DRM.22  Moreover, as Diehl notes,23 not only does the content owner not trust 
the content user, there is no easy way for a content owner to distinguish between 
honest and dishonest users.  Moreover, even if the content user could be trusted, this 
trust might not be warranted if another user controls the content user’s machine 
through malware. 
Finally, the business models upon which DRM are based are dynamic, and it is 
uncertain how suitable DRM designs in the literature are given the current socio-legal 
and socio-economic climate where DRM is now pervasive.  Although interoperability 
has long been cited as a ‘grand challenge’ for ecosystems where heterogeneous DRM 
solutions are pervasive,24 there has been little progress implementing interoperability 
in practice.  This is due in part to new classes of DRM attacks resulting from the need 
for device cross-compliancy and data leakage associated with the migrating content 
                                                 
20 A Kubesch and S Wicker, “Digital Rights Management: The Cost to Consumers [Point of View]” 
(2015) 103(5) Proceedings of the IEEE 726-733. 
21 S Michiels et al. “Towards a software architecture for DRM” (2005) Proceedings of the 5th ACM 
Workshop on Digital Rights Management (DRM ’05) 65–74. 
22 J Feigenbaum et al, “Privacy Engineering for Digital Rights Management Systems” in T Sander ed. 
Security and Privacy in Digital Rights Management volume 2320 of Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, 76-105  (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2002). 
23 E Diehl, Securing Digital Video: Techniques for DRM and Content Protection (New York: Springer, 
2012) 4-5. 
24 R Koenen et al “The Long March to Interoperable Digital Rights Management” (2004) 92(6) 
Proceedings of the IEEE 883-897. 
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for interoperability.25 However, it has also been suggested that interoperability 
requires DRM designers to publish more details of their design and implementation 
than they might feel comfortable doing.26 
5.   The Players in the DRM Game 
DRM systems are in essence technical locks designed to self-enforce copyright 
protection in the digital world. Traditionally, the golden triangle of the copyright 
stakeholders is formed by: a) the creator; b) the user; and c) the distributor.27 In what 
follows we will examine their different perspectives. 
 
5.1 Content Developers 
DRM impacts on a complex range of interests.28 Content developers are obviously 
one of the most relevant stakeholders, although they might not necessarily rely on 
legislation to enforce their policies.29 Self-enforcement of digital rights might be more 
effectively entrusted to cyber-protection technologies, especially given the practical 
difficulty to pursue millions of infringers. 
It has been argued that some users will inevitably try to use digital content without 
paying the appropriate fee, unless they are prevented from doing so by societal rules 
and social consensus.30 However, there is very little work on precisely which societal 
rules might be used to prevent the social perception that circumvention of DRM 
security in acts of piracy is a fair or a victimless act. Part of the ant-circumvention 
strategy of content developers relies on these rules.31 
For some content developers, moreover, the perception of DRM is arguably 
influenced by their business model, despite there is little literature dedicated to the 
relationship between business model choice and DRM deployment. For the case of 
videogame developers, for example, it is different whether they expect their product 
to generate a steady income stream or whether the product will be offered at a one-off 
price to a distributor, who will then take ownership of the rights and financial 
revenues. Many developers are start-ups, often backed by external investors who have 
                                                 
25 G Taban, A Cárdenas, and V D Gligor, “Towards a secure and interoperable drm architecture” 
Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management (DRM ’06) at 69–78 (New York, 
NY, USA: ACM, 2006). 
26 E Diehl, Securing Digital Video: Techniques for DRM and Content Protection (New York: Springer, 
2012)  4-5. 
27 W Grosheide, “Copyright Law from a User's Perspective: Access Rights for Users” (2001) 23(7) 
E.I.P.R. 321-325. 
28 It has been argued that “DRM requires a complex system of technical, organisational and social 
elements” See V Mayer-Schonberger, Beyond Copyright: Managing Information Rights with DRM. 
(2006) 84(1) Denver University Law Review 181, at 181. 
29 Digital content developers only accounted in total for “6.7% of lobby meeting requests with the 
evaluation rapporteur of the EU Parliament Copyright Directive 2001/29/EC”. See J Reda “EU 
copyright evaluation report – explained”  (2015) available at https://juliareda.eu/2015/01/report-eu-
copyright-rules-maladapted-to-the-web/ (accessed 09 Apr 15). 
30 V Mayer-Schonberger, Beyond Copyright: Managing Information Rights with DRM. (2006) 84(1) 
Denver University Law Review 181. 
31 M Yar, “The rhetoric and myths of anti-piracy campaigns: criminalization, moral pedagogy and 
capitalist property relations in the classroom” 2008 10(4) New Media & Society 605-623. 
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a financial interest in DRM deployment in order to maximise the return of their 
investment. In addition, changes in business models need to be considered in the 
wider DRM debate centred on the effectiveness and future of game security. Digital 
content production takes place in a very fast-moving environment,32 and while a 
business model can befit or indeed need DRM implementation, changes or 
modifications of the same business model can have entirely different requirements in 
terms of security policy, especially if the user acceptance enters the equation. 
It is questionable whether game developers should be leaving DRM for the publisher 
to deploy. After all, they are the original owner of the copyright arising from the 
creation of the product. They might be entitled to decide what usage restrictions are 
implemented on their creation. However, for a number of reasons that will be clearer 
in the last section of this paper, in practice (at least in the sector of game 
development) they prefer to leave content protection to the other side of the golden 
triangle: the distributor. 
 
5.2 Content Distributors 
The examined literature shows that the distributors have the strongest interest in DRM 
deployment. Developers are surrendering unprecedented control over their products to 
distributors.33 For developers to continuously improve the gameplay experience, they 
need a recurrent income stream or a large preliminary investment from a content 
distributor with a large market reach. 
Consumers now have a greater than ever choice of content through multiple 
merchants such as Google Play, iTunes, Xbox Live etc. As a consequence, one of the 
emerging business models for games is the ‘freemium model’ where the core game 
content is offered for free but value is added by optional in-game purchases such as 
in-game characters, extra content, cheats or game customisations.  
Because of the increasing implementation of this model, consumers of games are no 
longer considered a mere submissive receiver of products through an initial one-time 
purchase. The freemium model appears to eliminate the need for DRM in the 
traditional sense, as wider distribution of the core free game content targets a wider 
market share for in-game purchasing resulting in the higher probability of in-game 
purchases. However, even in freemium models DRM is implemented on additional 
purchases. While under the traditional one-off purchase business model the distributor 
appears to be shouldering the entire burden of rights protection and security, in the 
freemium model content protection is implemented by the developer, according to the 
requirement of digital distributors. 
While the costs of DRM implementation have been object of analysis,34 little attention 
has been paid to the legal implication of the fact that distributors are shouldering the 
                                                 
32 During the last two decades, for example, the digital content industry has undergone a period of 
significant change in both social and business strategy, ibid. 
33 C Darroch, “Problems and Progress in the Protection of Videogames: A Legal and Sociological 
Perspective” (2012) 1(1) The Manchester Review of Law, Crime and Ethics 136-172, at 136. 
34 P Petrick, Why DRM Should Be Cause for Concern: An Economic and Legal Analysis of the Effect 
of Digital Technology on the Music Industry. The Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Research 
publication n. 2004-09 (November 2004), available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/uploads/408/DRMPetrick.pdf, (accessed 12 Oct 15), at 27) 
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entire rights protections and security burden. If DRM is a complex of security 
mechanisms designed to protect the game assets, the distributor ends up taking full 
responsibility and, as a consequence, liability, for the security of the game. If this is 
the case, distributors are seemingly accepting responsibility for any possible security 
vulnerability associated with the development code, the game engine, or indeed any 
aspect of the game. This might have important legal consequences, for example in 
terms of vicarious liability.35 
 
5.3 Content Users 
DRM consists of a variety of security mechanisms designed to prevent users from 
carrying out actions that may breach rights protected by copyright and IP law.36 
However, this system of restrictions often fails to account for the permitted copyright 
exceptions granted to users in the EU or the fair use allowances granted in users in the 
USA.37 Both of these allowances permit backup copies for personal use, or for the 
purposes of educational use.  Users of rights-protected content account for only 20% 
of the total lobby meeting requests with the evaluating rapporteur of the EU European 
Parliament Copyright Directive 2001/29/EC.38 Regardless of the size of the 
stakeholder’s interest in DRM there is an underlying sense of an imbalance of power 
with the bias falling in the direction of rightholders. The rights holders appear to be 
free to undermine a number of lawful copyright limits granted by law to the users.39 
In addition, literature suggests that overly restrictive DRM systems are likely be 
counter-productive as they provide little in the way of an incentive for users to 
purchase legitimate, paid-for content.40 It can be argued that the financial motives for 
user piracy, or circumvention of DRM, would be less prominent if the pricing policies 
set by distributors were more aligned with current economic times.41 Unfair DRM in 
sum is not only against the law, but also against a sensible marketing policy. At 
present, distributors have unprecedented levels of power overprice determination and 
                                                 
35 Vicarious Liability in essence is the responsibility of any third party that has the “right, ability or 
duty” to control infringing acts. In this case the distributor will be the third party between the 
rightholder and the user. 
36 G Qun, Digital Contents Interoperability between Diverse DRM Systems (2010) Shandong, 
Intelligent Computing and Intelligent Systems (ICIS)(2)  at 170-173. 
37 M Favale, “Fine-Tuning European Copyright Law to Strike A Balance Between the Rights of 
Owners and Users”, (2008) 33(5) European Law Review 687-708, at 306) 
38 J Reda   “EU copyright evaluation report – explained”  (2015) available at 
https://juliareda.eu/2015/01/report-eu-copyright-rules-maladapted-to-the-web/ (accessed 09 Apr 15). 
39 For example, the game World of Warcraft (prior to the freemium model version) could not be 
successfully bought used, because of a DRM-based one-time installation key policy. See S Dusollier, 
“Tipping the Scale in Favour of the Right Holders: The European Anti- Circumvention Provisions” in 
Digital Rights Management - Technological, Economic, Legal and Political Aspects in the European 
Union (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2003) 462-478, at 462. 
40 C Darroch, “Problems and Progress in the Protection of Videogames: A Legal and Sociological 
Perspective” (2012) 1(1) The Manchester Review of Law, Crime and Ethics 136-172. 
41 In fact, arbitrary price determination by distributors of online products has been object of attention 
by Courts. See http://www.cnet.com/news/new-york-focuses-antitrust-probe-of-record-labels/ 
(accessed 5-Oct 15). 
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differentiation. This, in turn, has had a negative impact on the user’s attitude towards - 
and acceptance of - DRM technologies.42 
Another problem faced by users when interacting with the other stakeholders are 
language difficulties. For example, End User Licence Agreements (EULA), which 
include the Terms and Conditions of Use for rights-protected content, are often 
written using legalistic language and there is an apparent disengagement by content 
users of anything that appears written in that manner.43 In many cases the contractual 
relationship and legal terms that the user enters into with the rights holder are not 
given a second glance.  
Another example is the use of abbreviations in language used by different 
stakeholders, such as developers or distributors. In the online contracts the 
abbreviation TPM stands for Technological Protective Measure, but in the field of 
software development TPM is the abbreviation for Trusted Platform Module.44 These 
are only examples of the problems that can be caused by language difficulties across 
different stakeholder with mostly entirely different backgrounds and interests. 
6. The Need for Balance 
If the acceptance levels of DRM are to be improved, it is vital that a greater degree of 
balance is struck between the stakeholders.45 As can be seen from the discussion in 
this paper, rights protection within cyber-security is a complex issue with multiple 
viewpoints and social arguments for and against its implementation, where a focus on 
fairness is seldom present. In the Courts of Law, however certain attention for balance 
and fairness is sometimes visible. For example, the issue of DRM has been examined 
at the highest European level with regard to circumvention on games consoles. This 
circumvention is sometimes achieved through the commercialization of modified 
chips (‘mod chips’) which allow the user to play unauthorised games. 
The European Court46 held that the protection of ‘effective’ Technological Protective 
Measures (TPMs) can be extended to external hardware devices such as mod chips 
because there is nothing in the Information Society Directive 2001/29/EC of the 
European Parliament that forbids it, especially when considering the broad definition 
of TPMs provided by the directive. The Court however specified that a number of 
conditions need to be satisfied in order to allow the protection of TPMs. In particular, 
a) the aim pursued by the manufacturer implementing TPMs must be legitimate (e.g. 
it must seek copyright protection and not competition hindrance); b) TPMs must be 
suitable for the task (e.g. ‘effective’); and c) certain proportionality criteria must be 
met, which includes a number of considerations: the volume of infringing behaviours 
                                                 
42 C Darroch, “Problems and Progress in the Protection of Videogames: A Legal and Sociological 
Perspective” (2012) 1(1) The Manchester Review of Law, Crime and Ethics 136-172. 
43 M A Lemley, “Terms of Use” (2006) 91 Minn. L. Rev. 459-461 n.5. 
44This “is a crypto-graphic coprocessor chip that has been included on most enterprise-class PC and 
laptop motherboards produced in the past decade”, see J Challener, “Trusted Platform Module 
Evolution” (2013) 32(2) John Hopkins APL Technical Digest 1. 
45 S Dusollier, (2003) Tipping the Scale in Favour of the Right Holders: The European Anti- 
Circumvention Provisions, in Digital Rights Management - Technological, Economic, Legal and 
Political Aspects in the European Union (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2003) 462-478. 
46 Case C-355/12 Nintendo of Europe GmbH. v. PC Box Srl, 9Net Sr,  
ECLI:EU:C:2014:25. 
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compared to legitimate behaviours, and whether a different protection technology 
‘could cause less interference’ with legitimate uses.  
The above ruling clearly shows the highest European Court’s struggle regarding 
‘fairness’. The “fair balance of interests”, provided in the recitals (albeit not in the 
text) of the EU Copyright Directive,47 seems to be seriously considered by the 
judiciary invested with copyright matters. 
However, it is unlikely that DRM systems will ever be able to accurately predict or 
read human intent and, as such, there is a very fine line between legitimate fair use 
actions (i.e. hardware modifications to allow bespoke home-brewed content to run or 
be used for backup purposes) and those actions that have a secondary purpose that can 
carry out unlawful circumvention of DRM and breach TPMs.  Ultimately, the DRM 
system cannot know enough about the circumstances outside of the computer.48  
Moreover, human intent is only one part of the problem. Copyright infringement can 
be determined objectively, irrespective of the human intent, when the unlawful acts 
(unauthorised reproduction, communication, and distribution) are clarified by law. As 
this is not the case currently it can be suggested that legislative reform in this area is 
urgently needed.  
 
7. The need for Clarity and Legal Certainty 
From a legal perspective, DRM can create a variety of different disputes in the legal 
areas of copyright, privacy, competition, contract, and other branches of law. 
The complexity of the legislation regulating anti-circumvention measures, which are 
the provisions impacting on DRM, does not help legal certainty. For example, in 
Europe Technological Protection Measures have to comply with copyright exceptions, 
according to the Copyright Directive. But each EU country has implemented the 
directive with a different selection of exceptions with which TPMs have to comply, 
and it applied different civil or criminal charges against DRM circumvention.49 
In the US, the lack of a clear definition between fair uses from acts that would 
constitute copyright infringements does not help the status of DRM security. 
Although some uses are clearly fair and others clearly not fair, there is essentially a 
large grey area of uses that may or may not be conceived as fair and could only ever 
be settled with the assistance of a court ruling. Even a well-accomplished copyright 
lawyer cannot say with absolute certainty where the line between fair and unfair use is 
really found.50 
Moreover, although DRM legal protection originates and is defined within copyright 
protection, it is in practice implemented to achieve anti-competitive practices. For 
                                                 
47 Council Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright 
and related rights in the information society Official Journal L 167, 22/06/2001 P. 0010 – 0019, Recital 
31. 
48 E Felten, “A sceptical view of DRM and fair use” (2003) 46 (4) Communications of the ACM 56-59. 
49 M Favale, “Fine-Tuning European Copyright Law to Strike A Balance Between the Rights of 
Owners and Users”, (2008) 33(5) European Law Review 687-708, at 688. 
50 E Felten, “A sceptical view of DRM and fair use” (2003) 46 (4) Communications of the ACM 56-59, 
at 56. 
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example, interoperability requirements provided by the software directive51 prompt 
essentially competition issues;52 whereas on the side of the user, there are substantive 
privacy issues to be considered, as DRM can and is often used to track user 
behaviour.53 
Advances towards a balanced DRM will be determined not only by technology 
modifications, but also by current and emerging economic and legal developments.54 
However, when markets go through rapid change like the gaming sector has, it takes 
time for legislation to catch up.55 A fragmentary and out-dated legal framework 
increases the risk of litigation, which in turn increases variable costs to an unbearable 
extent for smaller players. 
Additionally, changes in the game development market, such as the development of 
new hardware platforms, different distribution methods, and new payment 
technologies, all carry risks and legal challenges that require access to legal 
professionals for those involved in disputes. These market factors aid the need for 
legal professionals specialising in the DRM sector, who are often at a loss trying to 
apply out-dated or excessively complex legislation to new scenarios. 
Additionally, the business models of the stakeholders involved in disputes around 
rights protection will also have an influence on the access to justice and legal 
outcome. The complexity of disputes in copyright law along with the nebulousness of 
the fair use exceptions, combined with the struggle of negotiating licensing 
agreements, mean that non-experts such as fledgling game developers are often at an 
informational disadvantage when they face a dispute involving DRM. In any legal 
dispute access to high quality legal advice is vital, but also dependent on having the 
financial means to defend one’s position and seek the necessary guidance prior to 
litigation. Financial health and the ability to seek high quality legal advice are more 
commonly found in larger more established organisations than smaller nascent 
organisations.56 
In sum, the ever-changing nature of content security and the complex legal issues 
DRM can create impact of the performance and commercial viability of small content 
producers. These problems can only be counteracted by a simplification of DRM 
regulations and the easy accessibility of alternative dispute resolution systems. 
                                                 
51 Council Directive 91/250/EEC, Official Journal L 122, 17/05/1991 P. 0042 - 0046, Article 6.2 . 
52 U Gasser and J Palfrey, “When and How ICT Interoperability Drives Innovation”, Berkman 
Publication Series, November 2007, available at 
https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/interop/pdfs/interop-breaking-barriers.pdf (accessed 12 Oct 15). 
53 D Burk and J Cohen, “Fair use infrastructure for rights management systems” (2001) 41 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Technology 48–82; J Feigenbaum et al, “Privacy Engineering for Digital Rights 
Management Systems” in T Sander ed. Security and Privacy in Digital Rights Management  volume 
2320 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 76-105  (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2002); J Cohen, 
‘DRM and privacy’, (2003) 18 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 575–616). 
54 G Heileman and P Jamkhedkar, “DRM interoperability analysis from the perspective of a layered 
framework” (2005) Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Digital rights management (DRM '05 -1) 
at 17-26. 
55 P Samuelson, “DRM {and, or, vs.} the law” (2003) 46(4) Communications of the ACM 41-45, at 41. 
56 W Davies and K Withers, “Public Innovation, Intellectual Property in a Digital Age” (2006) Institute 
for Policy Research 48, at 48. 
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8. The Perspective of the Developers 
The analysis carried out in the first part of this paper has produced a number of 
questions, which we have summarised in the following: 
 What are the motives and incentives of DRM circumvention? 
 Are cultural, legal, and/or commercial strategies effective against 
circumvention? Is DRM adding value? Or is value best reached through other 
measures? 
 On DRM and Contract (EULA), are DRM developers aware of the legal 
issues? 
 Are Developers aware of DRM limits (e.g. copyright limits and exceptions)? 
 Overall is DRM a human (social, legal) problem or a technical one? What is 
the solution? 
These questions formed the core of a semi-structured questionnaire that was 
submitted to a selection of UK based game developers. The responses to the 
questionnaire have been object of qualitative analysis. 
Our case studies implemented different business models: the Premium model online 
(one-off fee per game), the Freemium model online (game available for free and 
extras available for a fee), and the sale of game consoles. Interestingly, none of them 
reported to have given any consideration to content protection upfront, when choosing 
their business model. However, it was acknowledged that the need for DRM 
implementation varies among business models because the very need for protection 
and the concrete possibilities of protection are different. For example while the 
Freemium model has no need for protection at release stage, it needs DRM when 
additional features of the game are purchased. Conversely, game consoles and CD-
based Premium models need to implement DRM upfront if they want to avoid 
infringement. Moreover, server-based products offer more possibilities for controlling 
usage restrictions compared to client-based games.  
In order to identify the source of content restrictions within each model, we have 
asked whether the platforms have imposed DRM on developers, contractually or 
otherwise (e.g. more or less binding business practices). The developers’ responses 
suggest that all market leaders impose DRM implementation for the products they 
commercialise, whereas some minor player do not require content restrictions. 
Developers’ opinion on possible incentives for circumventing DRM mentioned the 
technical challenge for those that crack the game, and make it available on peer-to-
peer file sharing. Unskilled game downloaders from P2P platforms, conversely, 
according to the project participants were possibly incentivised by: a) getting the 
game without paying the price, b) trying the game before buying it (trial versions are 
no longer available), and c) freedom of using a lawfully purchased product. 
On the other side of the spectrum, developers’ incentives for the implementation of 
DRM were rather low. Developers know that DRM has a low consumer acceptance, 
and they fear that the market penetration of their products can be seriously impaired 
by content protection. However, they do implement content protection because this is 
required by the platform, especially those able to guarantee wider market distribution. 
Overall DRM is considered valuable, as it adds value to the product, but at the same 
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time it is described as a necessary evil.  In short, the general feeling of the 
interviewees was that they would rather not to have to worry about DRM. They would 
happily leave the whole task to the distributing platforms. 
Interestingly, the main incentive arising from content protection, and directly 
impacting on the interests of developers, are the data monitoring possibilities offered 
by DRM. In short, product protection technologies allow studying users’ behaviour. 
This information is valuable to determine future product modifications and in general 
future market policies.   
Costs of DRM implementation were not perceived as relevant by game developers as 
mostly shifted on the distributor (the platform); and costs of DRM circumvention 
(piracy) vary among business models. While game console developers showed a fair 
confidence in the effectiveness of their DRM, the others found that the costs of 
breaches in content protection were offset by the advantages of broader circulation of 
the product in the market.  
All the interviewees seem to be aware of a certain amount of DRM circumvention on 
their products, however they declared that they rarely action against it. In more detail, 
reported actions against DRM circumvention include: a) do nothing (“move on”), b) 
changing the code, and c) complain with the platform. The latter action seems to be 
effective due to corporate IP policies of large platforms, which handle the “notice and 
take down” process rather swiftly (and, it appears, without judicial scrutiny). 
Taking legal action seems to be considered the last resort from the interviewed 
developers, mainly because of cost/benefit considerations. In short, broad circulation 
of the product on the market is perceived as creating more advantages than losses. 
However, legal action is contemplated in the case of professional infringement, as in 
cases in which somebody cracks the digital lock in order to commercialize the game 
in competition with the right holder. 
The End User Licence Agreements (EULA) which is the contract between the user of 
the game and the rightholder (including the distributor) is either entirely handled by 
the platform or “borrowed” from competitors or other sources. Developers seem to 
have given no consideration to the legal aspects and implications of this document in 
terms of legislation they need to comply with (copyright, data protection, consumer 
protection).  
Some of the developers have encountered data protection issues in their day-to-day 
activity, in particular when collecting behavioural data on users. They refer to have 
addressed this by screening identity information (e.g. the name of the user or the 
credit card details) and by providing privacy policies for each product, explaining 
what type of data is collected, and which are accessible online. No tailored legal 
advice was sought or provided, unless presented with a specific problem, however 
general guidance seems to be available from industry trade bodies. 
Overall, the main problem with DRM technologies, according to game developers, is 
human/social, in the sense that DRM circumvention is not seriously perceived as 
“wrong”. They find that the attempts to develop a social conscience about it, such as 
equalling infringement to stealing, are ineffective and deceptive for the public. The 
issue of fairness is also perceived as tipping the balance against users, who cannot try 
the product before buying it, and cannot do what they want with things that they own. 
Legal sanctions against circumventions are also considered to be “unfair,” as they are 
way too severe. However, they all concur that although DRM circumvention is 
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basically a “human” issue, any viable solution can only be “technical”. Social and 
legal solutions are in fact perceived as highly ineffective. 
Finally, we asked our project participants what their dream scenario would be on 
DRM. While the short impulsive answer was “a world without it”, more serious 
reflections included the acknowledgement that a digital world without content 
protection would be neither reasonable nor viable. A more realistic dream scenario 
involves a flexible DRM that allows users more freedom, while protecting the rights 
of the owner at the same time. Moreover, they would like a seamless DRM that is 
easy to implement, as they would prefer to focus on the creative process. They believe 
that creating a very good product is more important than defending mediocre products 
from infringement. If the product is very good, some argued, consumer acceptance of 
DRM may increase, as the pleasure to play the game will overcome the annoyance of 
having usage restrictions. 
 
9. Conclusions 
There are multiple stakeholder views associated with DRM security. This paper 
searched the literature to provide some of them, and it gathered original data to 
complete the picture. Current research on DRM shows the human (social and legal) 
implication of DRM only in relation to the final user of the digital product. The 
perspectives of the games industry, content developers, and distributors have instead 
been examined from a technical point of view (e.g. DRM effectiveness). We submit 
that in the complex picture surrounding DRM there are also human (social/legal) 
aspects that need to be explored elsewhere, on the side of content producers, whereas 
some other human (e.g. legal/economic) issues should be pursued among the content 
distributors and the policy makers.  
The data we analysed in this paper suggests that while DRM circumvention is an 
essentially “human” problem, as it raises socio-cultural and legal issues, the only 
available solutions are “technical”. In practice, industry-led research only aims at an 
increasingly effective DRM to address the issue of circumvention. However, as DRM 
advances, so does DRM circumvention, as technology can be defeated by another 
technology. Focusing on the human aspects surrounding this technology, on the side 
of all players of the DRM game, can provide new and more effective tools to appease 
this contentious issue. 
 
